Recent changes in the strategies of US airlines have led to a convergence of unit costs between the Network Legacy Carriers (NLCs) and Low Cost Carriers (LCCs). We develop a methodology for breaking down operating cost data reported by the airlines and argue that certain cost categories must be excluded to make a valid comparison between the carrier groups. We find significant evidence of convergence in unit costs excluding fuel and transport-related expenses, and labor unit costs in particular. While NLCs have improved cost efficiency through dramatic labor cost reductions and longer stage length flying, LCC labor unit costs continue to increase as these former new entrant airlines mature.
Introduction
The US airline industry has been in a financial crisis for much of this new century, a crisis exacerbated by the terror attacks of 9/11. The rapid growth of Low-Cost Carriers (LCCs) This paper examines the extent to which the NLCs have been able to reduce the unit cost gap that historically has existed between them and their low-cost rivals. We examine the evolution of unit operating costs in the US airline industry from 1995 to 2006 and the underlying forces driving change. We conduct an in depth analysis of US DOT Form 41 financial and operating cost data to show that the NLC's cost-cutting strategy has resulted in substantial cost convergence between them and their low-cost counterparts. While a superficial comparison of total unit costs might suggest that the gap between NLCs and LCCs has increased since 2000, we present a breakdown of unit costs that clearly demonstrates that significant convergence has occurred.
In Section 2, we provide a brief review of relevant literature. Section 3 describes the dataset that we have used and explains our approach for determining airline group selections, the logic for excluding certain components of reported cost data in our comparisons, and the methodology used to aggregate the unit cost metrics. Section 4 presents the analysis of unit costs and is broken down into two parts: We first compare aggregate measures of unit costs between the NLC and LCC groups. We then take a look at individual airlines in both groups and provide more detail to help explain the observed convergence of unit costs. Section 5 summarizes the findings and discusses some of the implications of our analysis.
Literature Review
The focus of most studies of airline cost performance has been on comparisons of unit cost, specifically Cost per Available Seat Mile, or "CASM". CASM is defined as total airline operating expense over available seat miles (ASMs) produced. In turn,
ASMs equal the number of available seats flown by the airline, multiplied by the total distance flown by its aircraft.
The focus of previous studies of airline operating cost performance has evolved with historical changes in the airline industry. Shortly after deregulation of domestic airline markets in the United States, Jordan (1982) undertook an extensive study of the cost and productivity performance of Canadian airlines. In the US, early studies of the impacts of deregulation included Meyer et al (1981) , which looked for trends in airfares and service to small communities in addition to airline productivity and unit costs. Morrison and Winston (1986) established statistical relationships between airline operating cost variables and financial performance, with a focus on fuel and labor costs. Oum and Yu (1998) published an extensive study of productivity and cost competitiveness of world airlines, including the consideration of various financial indicators. And, in the US, the Government Accountability Office (2004) issued a report with a title that very clearly describes the study's principal conclusion: "Legacy Airlines
Must Further Reduce Costs to Restore Profitability".
In our comparative analysis of unit operating costs, we focus on the categorization of airline operating costs. Holloway (2003) provides an overview of the various types of schemes that have been established to categorize costs in the airline business. Doganis (2006) also discusses airline cost categorization, but concentrates more specifically on the importance of labor costs. He argues that labor costs along with fuel costs are the two most important cost categories because, when combined, they usually account for about 50% of an airline's total costs. The breakdown of costs into labor vs. non-labor is of particular relevance to the adjustments and comparisons we propose in the following section.
It should be noted that, although both researchers and airline managers often focus on the control of operating expenses and unit costs as an important strategy in competitive airline markets, low costs on their own do not guarantee profitability.
Revenues are just as critical to profitability and it could be argued that the recent financial crisis of US airlines was caused in large part by extreme price competition that lowered industry revenues overall. Our focus on unit costs excludes the impacts of price competition and revenues on airline industry profitability. However, it is clear that, without their lower cost structures, LCCs would not have been able to offer such low fares in US domestic markets. As in most industries, low-cost producers have an inherent competitive advantage.
Dataset and Methodology
The primary source of data used in our analysis consists of Form 41 filings to the US Department of Transportation. We used Form 41 P and B schedules filed by airlines to extract the financial and operating data, as shown in Figure 1 . We limited our study to 
Airline Group Selection
The Network Legacy Carriers (NLCs) are traditional airlines with comprehensive hub-and-spoke networks comprised of regional domestic, mainline domestic and international services. In contrast, Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) airlines that have smaller networks with a hybrid of hub and spoke and point-to-point network attributes, simpler service levels, and a lower overall cost structure that allows them to offer significantly lower fares. Although these definitions seem relatively straightforward, in practice not all airlines can be easily categorized as an NLC or LCC.
For example, Southwest has always been considered a LCC and for good reasonthey pioneered the concept of maintaining low operating costs in order to deliver a low fare product concept. Still, Southwest's original point-to-point network structure has evolved into a complex hybrid of point-to-point and multi-hub operations. There are also 
Unit Cost (CASM) Adjustments
In making valid comparisons of cost efficiency between NLCs and LCCs, it is necessary to make adjustments to the unit costs reported by the carriers to eliminate factors that can distort the comparisons. We identified two factors that can distort unit cost comparisons among airlines.
Transport related expenses for the most part represent payments made by airlines to regional carriers to provide services to smaller cities on their behalf, providing incremental connecting traffic and revenue to the mainline carrier. These payments clearly do not represent actual "operating expenses" related to the provision of the capacity (ASMs) output of the mainline carrier. Since the ASMs of the regional carrier are not included in the denominator of unit costs, the payments made to regional carriers should not be included in the numerator if we are comparing cost efficiency across airlines.
Excluding playing field when it comes to reported fuel costs. We believe that these financial decisions should not be included in our cost comparisons -we thus also removed fuel expenses from some of our comparisons.
After removing transport related and fuel expenses from total costs, we can break down the remaining costs into two categories:
Labor costs include total salaries, all social benefits and other costs, paid out to employees either directly or indirectly. This category gives an indication of cost of the labor inputs in an airline's total cost structure.
Non-labor costs include everything that is not part of transport related, fuel or laborrelated costs. It does include outsourcing which, of course, can have a labor component.
This category contains cost items that provide a good gauge of how management influences "controllable costs" in other areas of its operation.
A summary of our approach for adjusting CASM is presented in Figure 2 .
Aggregation of Cost Measures
To report aggregate measures for each airline group, we used weighted averages.
We summed the quarterly numbers extracted from Form 41 to produce annual totals, and then summed the data for each airline group (NLC vs. LCC) before computing cost measures using these aggregate results within each group. For example, the aggregate total unit cost of the NLC group is given for year "j" as follows:
where i=1,…,6 is the set of Legacy carriers and "j" represents year "j" of our time period (j=1995,…,2006) . This formula is equivalent to a weighted average on ASMs of each individual airline for each year "j". The same computations are repeated for the LCC group of carriers in order to obtain the "LCC" average.
Results of Unit Cost Comparisons
In this section we present the results of our unit cost analysis, in increasing levels of detail. The first part examines industry trends by comparing the aggregate unit costs of the NLC and LCC groups. The second part presents trends for individual airlines from both groups to identify which carriers have been the most successful at reducing their unit costs in the labor and non-labor categories. The non-labor CASM exTF category includes all remaining costs other than direct labor, fuel and transport-related expenses. In this sense it is a reflection of a company's internal cost structure resulting from a variety of factors such as network structure, fleet type, and outsourcing activity to name a few. It is thus difficult to identify the particular factors that are most responsible for the variations in non-labor CASM exTF . However, given the fact that excluding some variations between 2000 and 2005, the gap between both groups has remained stable, we expect to see the convergence in CASM exTF identified previously to be explained by a convergence in the labor component.
Aggregate Unit Cost
As shown in Figure 7 , NLC labor CASM exTF followed an upward trend starting at These increases, as well as the labor cost-cutting strategies, have reduced labor costs to less than 30% of the total in 2006. The non-labor cost category has also been reduced from 45% in 1995 to 30% in 2006. These results further support the conclusion that fuel and transport-related expenses have been the main drivers behind the increase in total unit costs shown in Figure 3 .
The results for the LCC group in Figure 9 reflect the same impact of fuel prices. AirTran managed to reduce their CASM exTF , Southwest, ATA and Spirit experienced an increase. ATA unit cost increased by 8%, explained by the difficulties the airline was experiencing during its bankruptcy. Spirit's results were substantially worse than the rest of the LCCs as it saw its CASM exTF increase by 25%, which can be explained largely by a fleet transformation.
Individual Airline Cost Comparisons
From these results it is clear that the NLCs have in general been more successful at cutting unit costs than their low-cost rivals, pointing towards a changing dynamic of cost convergence between the groups.
Labor Cost Component
The results shown in Figure 12 The NLCs have managed to reduce these costs by an average of 9%. American has made the greatest improvement, achieving a 28% reduction while Northwest was the only NLC to see an increase (of 5%), but the results predate any cost decreases being fully realized after emergence from bankruptcy. Further, it is important to note that maintenance costs stemming from a maintenance workers strike at Northwest have been shifted to outsourcing expenses which are included in non-labor costs. A major factor contributing to these non-labor cost reductions is the development of advanced information technology systems and the emergence of internet-based distribution and passenger processing. In absolute terms, the NLC group had average non-labor costs of During the same period LCCs also managed to reduce their non-labor unit costs by an average of 5%. Frontier was the most successful achieving a 27% reduction while Spirit was disproportionately unsuccessful, with a 27% increase. In 2006, the LCCs had an average non-labor CASM of $0.034/ASM which is still a clear advantage of 1 cent/ASM when compared to their NLC rivals. However, similar to the results for labor CASM, the non-labor CASM is also converging.
Non-Labor Cost Component
The most successful airline at keeping its non-labor CASM low is Southwest.
The airline's results stand out from its peers as it is the only LCC to have labor costs at a higher level than non-labor costs in 2006. We can see that during the 2001-2006 period, although Southwest was struggling with increasing labor costs as we saw in the previous section, it did a tremendous job in reducing its non-labor costs. As a result the airline's CASM exTF has remained almost constant.
Unit Costs and Stage Length
Our discussion of the trends in all measures of unit cost would not be complete without some mention of the role of stage length in affecting the unit cost comparisons.
Theoretical expectations and empirical results suggest that increasing stage length lowers unit costs, with all else equal, as the increase in operating expenses attributed to longer stage length is less than proportional to the increase in ASMs. Simply stated, longer stage lengths allow the fixed costs of each flight to be spread over more ASMs. 
Summary of Results and Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that during the period 2001-2006, both NLCs and  LCCs have gone through a period of fundamental change which has greatly affected their unit costs. During this period, the NLCs focused on downsizing and cost-cutting in an effort to regain profitability. On the other hand, most LCCs sought to accelerate their organic growth and capture significant market share from their NLC peers. However, the LCCs were also facing increasing labor costs driven by an aging fleet and by the fact that their staff was becoming more senior.
A superficial comparison of total unit costs for NLCs and LCCs during the period since 2001 would suggest that, despite the substantial efforts of NLCs to improve productivity and reduce operating costs, the unit cost gap between NLCs and LCCs has increased. Such a conclusion would be incorrect, based on misleading comparisons of cost data that include components that create distortions to unit cost metrics.
After making several adjustments to the unit cost data as reported, we found evidence of substantial convergence in the remaining portions of unit costs between NLCs and LCCs. The most dramatic convergence has occurred in labor unit costs, as they have decreased by 25% for the NLCs while continuing to increase for LCCs. By 2006, the historical labor unit cost advantage that LCCs have had in this category was all but eliminated. Non-labor unit costs also showed decreases for the NLC group, although the 9% reduction is more moderate relative to the drop in labor unit costs. LCCs took advantage of the same technologies and productivity improvements to lower their nonlabor unit costs by 5%, maintaining a 1 cent/ASM gap in this cost metric in 2006.
Our analysis of the changes in unit costs for individual airlines in each carrier group revealed that the NLCs which went through the bankruptcy process realized the greatest decreases in labor unit costs. Among LCCs, the changes in labor unit costs were mixed, as the oldest LCC Southwest saw its labor unit costs increase while the less mature and more rapidly growing JetBlue and AirTran were able to report a decrease in Despite the improvements in cost efficiency among NLCs identified in our analysis, the US industry still faces substantial challenges. The next round of labor negotiations may be the most important milestone in the U.S. airline industry since deregulation. As demonstrated in our analysis, airline employees have helped contribute to the short-term recovery of the industry. Finding a new model for compensation that is durable and works to address the cyclicality of the industry will be critical. Just as important will be the efforts of management to identify non-labor cost savings that can be sustained as networks and operating models are reconfigured. 
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